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ABSTRACT. The emotions of shame and guilt have recently appeared in
debates concerning legal punishment, in particular in the context of so called
shaming and guilting penalties. The bulk of the discussion, however, has
focussed on the justiﬁcation of such penalties. The focus of this article is
broader than that. My aim is to oﬀer an analysis of the concept of legal
punishment that sheds light on the possible connections between punishing
practices such as shaming and guilting penalties, on the one hand, and
emotions such as guilt, shame, and perhaps humiliation, on the other.
I contend that this analysis enhances our understanding of the various
theories of punishment that populate this part of criminal law theory and
thereby sharpens the critical tools needed to assess them. My general con-
clusion is that, in diﬀerent ways, all of the theories we encounter in this area
can beneﬁt from paying renewed attention to the nature of the connection
between the states act of punishing and its expected or perceived emotional
eﬀect on the individual.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following list of penalties to which convicted men
and women in the USA have recently been sentenced (see
Garvey 1998, pp. 734–737; Kahan 1996, pp. 631–634)
 A woman convicted of drug possession is ordered to stand on a
street corner wearing a sign saying, ‘‘I got caught possessing
cocaine. Ordered by Judge Whitﬁeld.’’
 An oﬀender convicted of DWI is ordered to paste a bumper
sticker on his car that reads, ‘‘CONVICTED: DWI.’’
 Men convicted of soliciting prostitutes in Kansas City, Missouri,
have their faces and names displayed on the local community
access channel in a program popularly known as ‘‘John TV.’’
 Men in San Francisco, California, are required to attend the
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‘‘School for Johns,’’ where former prostitutes lecture them about
life on the streets.
 A New York City landlord is sentenced to house arrest in one of
his own slums.
 A juvenile convicted of throwing a brick, which blinded the victim
in one eye, is ordered to wear an eye patch. He is permitted to
take it oﬀ only when he sleeps.
The inﬂiction by state ofﬁcials of penalties such as these as
an alternative to imprisonment has been the object of sustained
interest inside and outside the academia in particular in the
USA. In fact, it seems that the academic debate was to a good
extent a reaction to the legal practice, and in particular to a
number of creative sentences such as the ones listed above. One
question that has occupied some of the commentators
(Massaro 1997; Garvey 1998; Markel 2001) is whether diﬀerent
emotions could be expected to result from diﬀerent penalties
and whether that should be a cause of concern. Garvey (1998)
and Markel (2001), for example, argue that while the ﬁrst three
penalties above are likely to elicit shame, the last three are likely
to elicit guilt. They also argue that while there may be good
justiﬁcatory grounds to attempt to instil guilt in the oﬀender,
there are no such grounds in the case of shame. In light of this,
it is important in their view to restrict the term ‘‘shaming
penalties’’ to those undesirable penalties connected to the
intended inﬂiction of shame, and ‘‘guilting penalties’’ for those
desirable ones connected to guilt. As we shall see later, how-
ever, a concern for the elicited emotion is not on the agenda of
all the scholars writing in this ﬁeld. As a result, it is common to
ﬁnd the expression ‘‘shaming penalties’’ to refer to all of the
creative sentences that could belong to the list above. In order
to avoid confusion, in what follows I will use ‘‘shaming pen-
alties’’ in inverted commas only when referring to penalties
alternative to incarceration with no speciﬁcation concerning the
particular emotion such penalties are expected or aimed to
elicit.
This article aims to shed light on the relation between shame
and guilt, on the one hand, and legal punishment, on the other.
The topic of ‘‘shaming penalties’’ should provide a fertile
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ground on which to examine this relation. My focus, however,
is broader than that for two reasons. Firstly, there is important
work on this topic outside the ﬁeld of ‘‘shaming penalties’’.
Secondly, as mentioned above, even within that ﬁeld, some
scholars are largely unconcerned with the emotional effects of
their preferred penalties on their offenders. One question that
will occupy us here is precisely whether the state can afford to
be unconcerned with the believed emotional impact on the
individual of certain forms of punishment. At any rate, the
current diversity of stances with regard to the role that shame,
guilt and other emotions ought to play in a theory of punish-
ment, calls for further consideration of the very topic of their
relation to the concept of punishment. In what follows, I will
lay out a map of the intelligible relations between such emo-
tions, on the one hand, and the concept of punishment, on the
other. I hope this conceptual work to result in an improved
critical grasp of the diverse accounts that populate this area of
criminal law theory. I begin in Section II with a brief presen-
tation of the emotions of shame and guilt and the cognate
but often neglected emotion of humiliation. In Section III,
I introduce the notion of punishment and sketch an account of
its metaphysics that maps out the possible relations in which it
can stand to shame and guilt and, possibly, other emotions.
In Sections IV and V, I use this framework to evaluate some
accounts of ‘‘shaming penalties’’, guilting penalties, and guilt as
a form of punishment. Our conclusions will be speciﬁc to each
one of the theory types we will be discussing. To anticipate a
general conclusion, however, it seems that, in diﬀerent ways, all
of these theories can beneﬁt from paying renewed attention to
the nature of the connection between the states act of pun-
ishing and its emotional eﬀect on the individuals.
II. SHAME, GUILT, AND HUMILIATION
For the purposes of the following discussion we do not need to
present the philosophy and psychology of shame and guilt in
much detail.1 In this section, it should be enough to state our
1 See Rodogno (2008, Section 3) for a recent critical review of this
subject.
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preferred characterization of these emotions, make a few
central remarks about it, and note some of the diﬀerences be-
tween shame, guilt, and humiliation, which will turn out to be
particularly useful for our critical evaluation of ‘‘shaming
penalties’’.
I propose the following characterizations of shame and
guilt:2
In shame, the subject appraises his or her self as globally negative, degraded,
or worthless.In guilt, the subject appraises negatively his or her behavior as
transgressing a norm to which he or she adheres.
Shame and guilt are both emotions of negative self-evalua-
tion. This characterization is axed on the difference in their
respective focus of evaluation. In shame, one evaluates nega-
tively the self as whole (‘‘I am a bad (greedy, inconsiderate, etc.)
person’’, ‘‘I did that horrible thing’’) while in guilt the focus is
ones speciﬁc behavior (‘‘I did that horrible thing’’).3 For
example, having cheated at his term exam, Sam may feel guilt
for what he did but may alternatively or additionally feel shame
if the focus of his evaluation is on what that action reveals
about himself.
In conjunction with this characterization, we should also note
the following points. Firstly, I characterized shame and guilt as
involving appraisals. What these exactly are is a matter of de-
bate. Most generally, they are believed to be a form of evalua-
tion or cognition (Lazarus 2001, esp. 50–54; Leventhal and
Scherer 1987; Roberts 2003) that does not always take place at
the conscious level and does not necessarily involve judgment
and assent.4 Secondly, emotions should not be understood to
consist merely in appraisals: they also involve a distinctive
phenomenology. In particular, we should note that shame and
2 See Teroni and Deonna (2008) for a more elaborate version and dis-
cussion of this characterization.
3 Lewis (1971, p. 30) is at the origin of this distinction.
4 Roberts (2003) would talk of ‘‘construals’’ rather than ‘‘appraisals’’ but
the former share the same possibly unarticulated and unconscious nature of
the former.
RAFFAELE RODOGNO432
guilt share part of this phenomenology insofar as their negative
hedonic tone is concerned. These are unpleasant emotions. Yet
the quality of the pain they involve is distinct and characterized
by the cognitive element – the type of evaluation – of each
emotion. Thirdly, emotions such as shame and guilt involve
preparedness to act in certain ways. Shame is generally associ-
ated with hiding, escaping, and striking back, while guilt with
confessing, apologizing, and repairing. Fourthly, in the most
interesting senses of this distinction, shame is not essentially
public and guilt essentially private.5 In particular private
occurrences of shame are as frequent as private occurrences of
guilt. There is no evidence that an audience, real or imagined, is
a necessary feature of our shame experiences.6
This brings us to our ﬁnal remark, which connects the topics
of shame and humiliation. Until very recently there was scant
empirical work on the emotion of humiliation as distinguished
from shame, with exceptions in the ﬁeld of clinical work. Elison
and Harter (2007) and Smith et al. (2008) have, however, begun
to set the record straight. The results reported in the latter study
are particularly relevant here, for they are based on a number of
experiments that reproduce quite closely – in the imagination of
the subjects – the conditions of ‘‘shaming penalties’’. In par-
ticular, it is worth our while mentioning the following results.
Though humiliation and shame both involve a negative eval-
uation of the self, they diﬀer from each other in a number of
ways. (a) Though both emotions are hedonically negative,
humiliation is perceived to be the more painful emotion and
extremely painful in absolute terms (as opposed to shame which
is moderately painful). (b) Humiliation has a stronger associ-
ation to public exposure and is more sensitive to it than shame;
in particular, public exposure to a group rather than a single
5 See Deonna and Teroni (2008) for an illuminating discussion of this
point.
6 Note however that Smith et al. (2002) present strong evidence that
shame is more strongly related than guilt to public exposure. More precisely,
the intensity of shame experiences but not guilt experiences increases with
increased public exposure.
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individual tends to increase the intensity of humiliation but not
shame. (b) In its reactions, humiliation is more other directed
than shame: feeling humiliated typically involves anger,
antagonistic, even vengeful attitude toward others while shame
is accompanied by self directed anger associated with a belief
that the self is to blame for the experience. (c) The intensity of
humiliation but not shame tends to increase with the perception
of inappropriate and underserved treatment such as a severe
reprimand, perpetrated by another person, mostly so when
combined to group public exposure. (d) Humiliation, but not
shame, tends to increase and is especially intense when the
humiliated person believes that the publicity has been deliber-
ately enacted by the agent of humiliation (above all if in con-
junction with group public exposure and severe reprimand).
(e) Even if the humiliated person imagined by the experimental
subjects was described as having committed a wrongdoing, the
subjects tended to expect that, as a result of being humiliated,
the person would feel unfairly treated, angry (at the agent of the
humiliation), and vengeful. This pattern appears remarkably
diﬀerent from the reactions associated with shame. Consistent
with much recent thinking on shame, when the person was
expected to feel shame they were also expected to feel that they
deserved their shame. These ﬁndings, then, suggest that public
condemnation with a severe reprimand, especially when inten-
tionally created and in a broader public context, will tend to
instil experiences of humiliation with its hostile reactions. It will
also sometimes reduce guilt and shame as well as intentions to
apologize. These results will be very important for our discus-
sion of ‘‘shaming penalties’’ in Section IV. First, however, we
should say more about the concept of punishment, to under-
stand how, if at all, emotions such as shame, guilt, or humili-
ation connect with it.
III. SHAME, GUILT, AND THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT
In this section, I begin by introducing some familiar require-
ments theories of punishment must, according to many,
address. I then build on these requirements in order to sketch
an analysis of the concept of punishment focussed on the
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possible connections between acts of punishing and their in-
tended effects. This analysis will allow us to see the possible
place shame and guilt can occupy within theories of punish-
ment. First, however, four familiar points about punishment.
1. Punishment involves as one of its necessary features the intention
by an oﬃcial institution and its agents to inﬂict on the oﬀender
some burden, deprivation, harm, or hard treatment. More gen-
erally, in what follows I will be saying that legal punishment must
necessarily involve the intentional inﬂiction of a disvalue.7
2. Punishment under the law must express social condemnation
(Feinberg 1965; Primoratz 1989). The idea here is that a theory of
punishment must be able to account for the distinction between
punishment and nonpunitive sanctions. While torts typically
involve harms to others, crimes typically involve such harms plus
a special kind of wrongdoing on behalf of the oﬀender.8 While
nonpunitive sanctions must address only harms and typically do
so through material reparation, criminal punishment must
address harms plus wrongdoing.9 Punishment, or the reparation
7 There is an issue concerning whether all disvalues must involve sub-
jective feelings. Elsewhere (Rodogno 2009), I defend the claim that experi-
entiality is not a necessary feature of human well-being, and hence of
individuals prudential value and disvalue: an individuals well-being can be
aﬀected positively or negatively in the absence of any positive or negative
experience in the individual. Yet, when it comes to punishment, there may
be reasons to want to inﬂict experiential disvalues.
8 ‘‘Typically’’ because it is not clear that, as opposed to mala in se, mala
prohibita always involve harm to others.
9 Yet, we should note the following two points. Firstly, whilst some kinds
of criminal liability do not seem to depend on actual harm (inchoate lia-
bility), they do depend on the creation of a risk of harm (and some
(e.g. Finkelstein 2003) would count risk itself as a harm). Secondly, whilst
some kinds of criminal liability do not seem to depend on (culpable)
wrongdoing (e.g. strict and vicarious liability), they are for that very reason
controversial (see e.g. Simester 2005).
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of crime, then, has a symbolic as well as a material aspect. The
symbolic aspect consists in social condemnation.10, 11
3. It is important to understand the nature of the relation between
these two elements of the deﬁnition of punishment. At the deﬁ-
nitional level, hard treatment and expression of condemnation are
10 I should mention two issues in conjunction with the expressive char-
acter of punishment. Some say that punishment ought to communicate
rather than simply express condemnation, where communication, as
opposed to expression, implies that eﬀorts be made to ensure that the lis-
tener hear the message. Among scholars defending this view are Duﬀ (2001)
and Markel (2001). The second connected issue concerns whether the
expressive dimension is analytically independent from the justiﬁcatory
dimension of punishment. Feinberg (1965) claims that it is while Nozick
(1981, p. 370) takes it to be a form of retributivism and so do Hampton
(1992) and Markel (2001). Moore (1997) thinks it is also an aspect of jus-
tiﬁcation but the justiﬁcation is utilitarianism rather than retributivism.
11 Why social condemnation? The answer goes at the heart of theories of
criminalisation and spells out the ‘‘special kind of wrong’’ of the criminal act
as opposed to the tort. The wrongful aspect of criminal acts is itself
expressive though what it expresses is a matter of debate. The oﬀenders
wrongful act is often thought to express the idea that he has greater worth
than the rest of the individuals in the community, that he counts himself free
to pursue his own interests without regard to, and indeed at the expense of,
the others. ‘‘It is a message of contempt, insult, dishonour, disrespect, and
so forth…’’ (Garvey 2003, pp. 280–281; see also Murphy and Hampton
1988, p. 25). By condemning the crime, punishment sends a message back to
the wrongdoer denying his superiority and a message to the community that
such wrongs will not be tolerated. For want of space, I cannot discuss here
many important issues concerning this particular aspect of punishment.
Note that there may be diﬀerences for example as to what exactly is the
meaning of criminal acts. Duﬀ (2001) argues that not all crimes carry the
demeaning message spelled out above. Garvey (2003) agrees and argues that
that type of message captures one paradigmatic type of criminal act (which
he calls ‘‘wicked wrongs’’) but not another (‘‘vicious wrongs’’). Finally we
should note that these are diﬀerences among those who think that an
essential trait of punishment is indeed to convey social condemnation. This
very idea, however, has been disputed (Hart 1963, pp. 60–69; Skillen 1980;
Davis 1996, pp. 169–181), though I believe some of those disputing it (e.g.
Skillen 1980) tend to confuse the deﬁnitional issue (the notion of punish-
ment necessarily involves social condemnation) with the justiﬁcatory issue
(punishment is justiﬁed when it expresses appropriate social condemnation).
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clearly distinguishable. Yet, in reality, the two must go together
(Feinberg 1965, p. 402; Skillen 1980, pp. 515–519; Primoratz
1989, pp. 187–188): as Feinberg claims, the hard treatment itself
expresses condemnation. Importantly, not all types of action can
express appropriate censure. As Skillen (1980) argues – and this is
our third point –, there must be the right connection to the atti-
tude of punitive hostility and this, I gather, is in place only for
certain rather harsh treatments. As he puts it (1980, p. 517),
appropriate censure embodies punitive hostility rather than sim-
ply symbolizing it as a matter of convention. To understand this
distinction, think about the diﬀerent relation of, respectively,
crying and wearing black to grieving. There is a sense in which
one is the natural embodiment of the emotion while the other is a
conventional or contextual symbol of it. Imposing loss of prop-
erty, of liberty, of parts of ones body, along with shunning and
ostracism, seem to censure while embodying punitive hostility.
An oﬃcial but relatively private reprobation, however, though
expressing social condemnation and possibly involving some
amount of distress, can hardly be thought to embody punitive
hostility.
4. Theories of punishment, then, must account for state actions that
are aimed at inﬂicting certain types of disvalue on wrongdoers
while at the same time expressing social censure. The fact that the
state is authorized to inﬂict disvalues on individuals calls for a
justiﬁcation, and this is the fourth point concerning theories of
punishment I would like us to retain. Theories of punishment will
have to come up with acceptable stories as to why the state is
morally permitted (or has a duty) to inﬂict such disvalues on
wrongdoers. The types of justiﬁcation available are of diﬀerent
and contrasting kinds: retributivist, consequentialist, hybrid, or
communicative. For our purposes, it is enough to note the
necessity of at least a valid type of justiﬁcation for legal punish-
ment.
The four points so far discussed are standard fare for any
theory of punishment, even though, as the footnoted discus-
sions document, there are disagreements about them. Some-
thing that has not been as widely discussed is what these points
taken together can tell us about the role of emotions such as
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shame and guilt in legal punishment. Before embarking on this
discussion, however, an important clariﬁcation concerning the
very boundaries of the concept of punishment is necessary. We
can put the question at hand here as follows: is ‘‘punish’’ an
activity verb, i.e., the bodily movement of the punisher intended
to inﬂict a disvalue in the punished individual; or is an
accomplishment verb, i.e., the action that consists of the bodily
movement of the punisher and the result in the punished indi-
vidual?12 Using the noun ‘‘punishment’’ (rather than the verb
‘‘punish’’), we may similarly ask whether punishment is exclu-
sively what the state does or whether it is a concept that nec-
essarily refers to the results of the states action in the oﬀender.
To illustrate, suppose the state decides to incarcerate a criminal
as a form of punishment. Incarcerating the criminal is some-
thing the state does. When talking about punishment, some will
focus exclusively on this activity: punishment is punishing.
Others, however, will certainly agree that punishment involves
an activity of the state while stressing that it is also something
the criminal suﬀers. One can actively punish, just as much as
one can passively suﬀer punishment. This may indicate that
‘‘punish’’ is an accomplishment rather than a simple activity.
Which of these views is correct?
Answering this question is relevant here, for, according to
which one of them is correct, the emotions of shame and guilt
may stand only in certain intelligible relations to punishment
and not others. If the activity view were correct, for example,
shame and guilt can never be part of the punishment as they are
not something the state does. On this view, shame and guilt can
be goals or ends of punishment – end-states the hard treatment
constituting punishment might be intended to cause – but they
cannot constitute the hard-treatment itself. Similarly, on the
activity view, suﬀering ones loss of freedom is not the pun-
ishment: only incarceration, i.e., the intentional inﬂiction of a
disvalue, is. One argument speaks in favour of this view.
Consider the fact that some individuals may actually thrive (or
12 We may also ask whether alternatively it was an achievement, i.e., the
result only, considered in its normative context. I would think, however,
that few are prepared to take this option seriously and that the contention is
really between ‘‘punish’’ as an activity as opposed to an accomplishment.
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maybe not suﬀer particular pains) as a result of their incar-
ceration. Even in these circumstances, however, we are able to
recognize their incarcerating by the state as an act of punish-
ment. This suggests that the occurrence of the actual intended
disvalue is not necessary to individuate any token punishment
as such, which leaves us with the punishing activity as the main,
if not, only element in the metaphysics of punishment.
The activity view, however, seems to run against the
following commonsensical intuition, which rather favors the
accomplishment view. Consider our incarceration example once
again and imagine that, as most individuals, our incarcerated
criminal is actually suffering in many ways as a result of
incarceration. If you now ask him which is his punishment, the
incarcerating, or the disvalues he suffers, I believe you should
be quite prepared to hear him point to the latter at least as
much as the former. If you are inclined to accept the inmates
answer as idiomatic, you may be inclined to think that the
boundaries of the concept of punishment extend beyond the
mere activity of the punisher to include the intended results or
effects of this activity. What we called above the ‘‘end-state’’ or
‘‘goal’’ of punishment, is not something other than punishment
but itself constitutive of it. On this view, if shame and guilt are
the intended disvalue for the offender they are as much part of
his punishment as the activity of the state that aims to inﬂict
them.13
In what follows, I argue that the accomplishment view is the
only plausible view because nothing can even begin to count as
a state punishing without reference at some level to the effect or
result of that act in the offender, and only the accomplishment
view can account for this. I will then show how this view tackles
the one argument in favour of the activity view, to wit, that we
can individuate a token punishing as such even when it fails to
create the disvalue it was intended to inﬂict. Having straightened
13 Importantly, however, though the accomplishment view accommo-
dates the possibility that shame and guilt are constitutive of punishment, it
does not yet impose on those who defend shaming or guilting penalties the
view that shame and guilt are the intended inﬂicted disvalue. As we shall see,
it is theoretically possible to defend such penalties while thinking that
experiencing shame and/or guilt is never a disvalue.
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this issue, we will be able to map out the places emotions can
occupy within a theory of punishment.
A key to understanding my argument is the distinction
between type and token acts. Let me expose the structure of the
argument ﬁrst, and then illustrate it with an example.
(a) The intention to inﬂict a disvalue is a necessary element of the
concept of punishment.
(b) Any type of action that qualiﬁes as punishment must be believed
generally to be connected to some disvalue (that, as per (a), the
state aims to inﬂict).
(c) Any token act of punishment that fails to generate a disvalue
counts as a token punishment only insofar as at the type level, as
per (b), that act is believed to be generally associated to some
disvalue.
To illustrate, consider the claim (i) that incarcerating is a
type of action that, under the appropriate circumstances,
qualiﬁes as punishment. The truth of (i) must entail, as per (a),
that incarcerating is intended to inﬂict a disvalue. But what
grants that belief? It must be, as per (b) a widespread belief to
the eﬀect that incarceration is generally connected to a disvalue
and, in fact, in our society there is a widespread belief that
generally, life in prison is bad for a person or worse than life
outside. If that belief came to be progressively eroded, there
would be a point at which incarceration would cease to count as
a punishment.14 The believed generality, as opposed to uni-
versality, of the association between a certain action type and a
disvalue is worth noting, and we shall soon return to it. First,
however, let us consider (c). Note that when considering whe-
ther a token state action is a punishment we are, of course, in
the process of individuating a token action (Ss incarcerating of
y at t) that belongs to a certain type (the incarceration type) as
belonging to another type, the punishment type. If (b) is cor-
rect, the identiﬁcation of any token state action as a punish-
ment turns out to depend on a believed general connection
14 Note how the claim that a state is ‘‘punishing’’ its criminals by inviting
them to take a fully paid trip to the best Caribbean Sea resort hotel is simply
unintelligible.
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between that type of action (incarceration) and a disvalue:
without that believed connection, no token state action can
begin to count as a punishment. This shows that the notion of
punishment hinges on the speciﬁc nature of the eﬀects it is
believed to elicit. This also explains away the force of the one
argument in favour of the activity view. Reference to the eﬀects
intended by the state action is already embedded in anything we
count as punishment and that, even when a token punishment
fails to elicit the intended disvalue. In order for us to identify
these cases as punishment, there must be a believed connection
between action type and disvalue; however, this connection is
and is believed to be only a general rather than a universal one
and hence it may in certain cases fail. By allowing ‘‘punish-
ment’’ to cover the eﬀects of the state action on the punished
individuals, the accomplishment view qualiﬁes as a plausible
view of punishment, while, for failing to do so, the activity view
is disqualiﬁed.
How does this elucidation of the notion of punishment shed
light on its connection to shame and guilt? We now see that
shame and guilt can stand in the following relations to pun-
ishment:
Constitutive View: Shame and/or guilt are the constitutive aim or
intended disvalue of certain types of punishment.
Non-Constitutive View: Shame and/or guilt are not the constitutive
aim or intended disvalue of certain types of punishments though
they are still related to them in some way.
To say that shame and/or guilt are the constitutive aims of
punishment is not to say that they are what the state does but
rather that they are the disvalue the state aims to inﬂict which, as
we saw, must be part of the notion of punishment. This account
must satisfy three important requirements: (a) there must be a
sense in which shame and/or guilt are disvalues; (b) there must
be some type of action that is generally connected to the elici-
tation of shame and/or guilt; and (c) these types of actions must
embody punitive hostility and social censure.
Before introducing the Non-Constitutive View, we shall
bestow some initial plausibility to the Constitutive View by
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addressing the ﬁrst requirement: can shame and guilt be dis-
values? The answer here is a clear ‘‘yes’’. As we have seen, one
common trait of these emotions is their negative hedonic tone:
experiencing either one of these emotions is generally painful.
To the extent to which experiencing pain is a disvalue, if the
state causes any of these emotions to arise in someone, it
thereby inﬂicts a disvalue.15 This is not the whole story yet. On
the Constitutive View, the punisher may be interested in shame
and/or guilt as punishments, in two rather diﬀerent ways,
essentially and non-essentially. If the punisher is seeking shame
and guilt essentially, it is seeking the particular brand of psychic
pain that they respectively produce.16 As we have seen, what
distinguishes shame, guilt, and other painful emotions from
each other are the particular cognitions that characterize each
one of them. The punisher, then, may deﬁne the disvalue it aims
to inﬂict as essentially involving the speciﬁc pains of shame
and/or guilt, rather than simply unspeciﬁed psychic pain. We
cannot exclude, however, that the punisher is out to inﬂict
unspeciﬁed psychic pain, and that shame and guilt ﬁgure in a
list of elicitors of pain along with other emotional experiences
such as humiliation, disgust, etc. In these circumstances, we
could still say that shame and guilt are the disvalue the punisher
15 Some may want to deny that inﬂicting the pains of guilt while painful
and burdensome amounts to a harm because it supposed to beneﬁt the
wrongdoer. I suppose the idea here is that inﬂicting pain on someone is not a
harm insofar as it leads to this persons greater good or well-being. We could
consider the pain I receive when I go to the dentist in this way. It is not harm
because it is inﬂicted with an eye to my greater good. Let us accept this point
for the sake of argument. I think that only a full-blown justiﬁcation of
punishment can show that punishment does not involve harming the
oﬀender in this sense. At the deﬁnitional level, we cannot bring substantial
justiﬁcatory views to bear. I think that at this level it is all right to regroup
harms, pains, burdens, etc. as things that are at least pro tanto bad for the
agent.
16 I am assuming that there are hedonic qualities within the positive and
within the negative range. Hence pleasures do not vary only along intensity
and duration axes. They may also be qualitatively diﬀerent as in, the plea-
sure of drinking a hot chocolate is a (qualitatively) diﬀerent kind of pleasure
than that of reading a good novel.
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aims to inﬂict though the speciﬁc pains of shame and/or guilt
would be inessential to the deﬁnition of the intended disvalue.
Let us now turn to the Non-Constitutive View. At bottom,
this view differs from the Constitutive View in failing to
consider shame and/or guilt as the disvalues the state aims to
inﬂict. Yet, for us to regard this view as relevant at all here,
shame and/or guilt must ﬁgure somewhere in a ‘‘non-
constitutive’’ theory of punishment. The only place I suggest
they can appear is at the level of justiﬁcation: shame and/or
guilt are not what the state should inﬂict on offenders as part
of their punishment but are desirable outcomes of some form of
punishment or other, insofar as they play a speciﬁc justiﬁcatory
role. Of course, someone endorsing the Constitutive View may
also argue that shame and/or guilt can have an important
justiﬁcatory role. After all, something can be at the same time a
disvalue and a justiﬁcation. Hence, as stated above, what dis-
tinguishes the two views is, at bottom, their respective stance on
shame and/or guilt as part of punishment.
Just as the Constitutive View, the Non-Constitutive View
has to fulﬁl some requirements. One seems particularly
important here. On this view, the state aims to inﬂict something
bad other than shame and/or guilt. The connection between the
punishing, on the one hand, and shame and/or guilt, on the
other, is hence severed. What we need, then, is a coherent
account of the connection between certain types of punishment,
on the one hand, and the elicitation of shame and/or guilt on
the other not as the intended disvalue but as the desirable
upshot. Is there, for example, a clear link between incarcera-
tion, on the one hand, and shame and/or guilt, on the other? If
there is, this view can begin to tell us a story as to how incar-
ceration is (at least partly) justiﬁed via shame and/or guilt
(provided there is also a cogent account of the justiﬁcatory
power of shame and/or guilt). If the penalties under consider-
ation are shaming and guilting penalties, it may be easier to
show a connection between the punishing and the emotions of
shame and/or guilt than in the case of, say, incarceration. As we
shall see, however, it may be difﬁcult to show that some of these
‘‘penalties’’ amount on their own to full-ﬂedged punishments.
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To sum up, ﬁrstly, I argued that, on the correct analysis, the
concept of punishment embeds a reference to the speciﬁc kind
of disvalue it aims to elicit in the offender. Secondly, I showed
that this analysis allows us to map three conceptual positions in
which shame and/or guilt can stand in relation to punishment:
(a) constitutive and essential; (b) constitutive and inessential;
and (c) non-constitutive and justiﬁcatory. In what follows,
I shall apply this framework to those theories one may expect to
bring together shame and/or guilt, on the one hand, and pun-
ishment, on the other. The aim is to enhance our theoretical
grasp and critical assessment of this part of criminal law theory.
In the next section, I focus on that part of the literature on
‘‘shaming penalties’’ that seems unconcerned with the emo-
tional effects of their preferred penalties. In the section after
that, I examine some of the literature keen on making con-
nections between guilt and punishment.
IV. ‘‘SHAMING PENALTIES’’
The views at hand in this section are typically unconcerned with
shame, guilt and, in fact, any other emotion that punishment
may elicit. Their lack of concern, however, does not mean that
such views do not in fact involve connections to emotions. In
principle, these views may occupy any of the positions outlined
above and, in fact, any place outside it. The point of the map
drawn in the last section, is precisely to guide our intellectual
journey across this ﬁeld by asking some cardinal questions. The
questions will be the following: do defenders of ‘‘shaming
penalties’’ think of shame or any other emotion as part of the
punishment, i.e. as the intended disvalue? If so, are they
interested in the speciﬁc brand of pain of any emotion in par-
ticular? If not a part of the punishment, do shame, guilt, or any
other emotion stand in a purely justiﬁcatory relation to pun-
ishment?
The best place to begin answering these questions is Kahans
(1996, pp. 631–634) categorisation of shaming sanctions. There
are, according to him four types of shaming sanctions:
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1. Stigmatising publicity: sanctions attempting to magnify the
humiliation inherent in conviction by communicating the oﬀen-
ders status to a wider audience.17
2. Literal stigmatisation: sanctions involving the stamping of an
oﬀender with a mark or a symbol that invites ridicule. The stigma
is sometimes attached to the oﬀender property.18
3. Self-Debasement: penalties involving ceremonies or rituals that
publicly disgrace the oﬀender. These are the closest contemporary
versions of the stocks. Oﬀenders are typically asked to stand in a
public space (a courthouse or a street corner) wearing a sign or
making a speech.19
4. Contrition: sanctions of this kind come in two forms. The ﬁrst
requires oﬀenders to publicise their own convictions, describing
their crimes in ﬁrst-person terms and apologising for them. The
sincerity of the oﬀenders remorse seems largely irrelevant.20
Another form of contrition is the apology ritual, which requires
sincerity.21,22
17 See for example the ‘‘John TV.’’ penalty mentioned in the Introduc-
tion.
18 See for example the ‘‘bumper sticker’’ penalty mentioned in the
Introduction or various sentences for petty thieves, DUI convicts, or child
molesters who were ordered to wear t-shirts, bright-coloured bracelets, or
signs announcing their crimes.
19 See for example, the ‘‘cocaine’’ penalty mentioned in the Introduction
but also sentences ordering those who urinate in public to clean the citys
streets and those ordering landlords whose building was condemned as a
slum, to post a four-foot square sign on the building that lists his name
together with his phone number.
20 For example, a company is ordered to publish apologies for dumping
carcinogenic chemicals.
21 For example, in Maryland, juvenile oﬀenders must apologise on their
hands and knees and are released from conﬁnement only if they persuade
their victims that their remorse is sincere.
22 Commenting on Kahans classes of shaming penalties, Massaro (1997,
p. 691, note 235) criticised the class of self-debasement penalties as blurry,
claiming that all the penalties described by Kahan ‘‘presumably share this
self-abasement characteristic.’’ Yet, I doubt that Kahan intended these
classes to be mutually exclusive. In fact he describes the ﬁrst form of con-
trition penalties as a combination of ‘‘stigmatizing publicity with an element
of self-debasement’’, that is, a mixture of the ﬁrst and third classes of
shaming sanctions (Kahan 1996, p. 634).
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What penalties from these categories have in common is
(1) that they rely to a good extent on an aspect of publicity and
a large audience. Their exposing, ceremonial aspect is not
accidental. (2) They are all intended to debase the offender by
reprimanding him publicly. These traits are what properly
qualify these penalties as shaming. Shaming, in fact, can be
characterised as the act of a shamer which is intended to debase
someone before an audience.23
Interestingly, though Kahan takes shaming to be central to
these penalties, the emotion of shame is not mentioned here as
the intended disvalue, nor is any other particular emotion.
Kahan (1996, pp. 636–637) is quite explicit on this point:
Shaming penalties might even more accurately be described as degradation
penalties. All of them satisfy what Harold Garﬁnkel identiﬁes as the
‘‘conditions of successful status degradation ceremonies’’: they are imposed
by an agent invested with the moral authority of the community; they de-
nounce the wrongdoer and his conduct as contrary to shared moral norms;
and they ritualistically separate the wrongdoer from those who subscribe to
23 This, I think, is what shaming consists in at its essence. There are,
however, richer characterisations of shaming such as the one oﬀered here by
Kahan and Posner (1999, pp. 368–369): ‘‘Shaming is the process by which
citizens publicly and self-consciously draw attention to the bad dispositions
or actions of an oﬀender, as a way of punishing him for having those
dispositions or engaging in those actions. Several elements of this deﬁnition
should be emphasized. First, shaming is a matter of revealing information
about a persons dispositions or actions. Second, the revelation of infor-
mation includes an expression of the speakers moral revulsion about these
actions or dispositions. Third, the revelation of information must be done in
a way that is known to the target of the shaming; when we secretly gossip
about someone, we are not shaming him. Fourth, people who witness the
shaming must believe that the targets actions or dispositions are wrong.’’
Lets call this legal shaming. Now, to the idea of public and purposeful
degradation of a person, legal shaming adds: (1) that shaming reveals facts
about the persons dispositions and actions; (2) that the shamer expresses his
or her revulsion concerning such dispositions and actions; and (3) that the
audience must believe these actions and dispositions to be wrong. Now,
these additions may very well be necessary for legal shaming understood as a
form of legal sanction but it does not have to be true of some more basic
forms of shaming. Think about a child publicly ridiculing another child
before his peers for something like his small size or the clothes he is wearing.
None of the three extra features Kahan mentions are at play and yet we
would be in the presence of shaming, albeit of a rather basic form.
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such norms. It is not a condition of a successful degradation ceremony that
it induce any particular belief or emotion on the part of the oﬀender. We
might expect the ceremony to cause shame—particularly if the oﬀender
identiﬁes with the community that is denouncing him. But to lower the
oﬀenders social status within that community, it is enough that the aﬄiction
convey disapproval in terms that its members understand.
Shame may be induced by shaming or degradation penalties
but its presence is not necessary for successful ceremonies. In
fact, it is not even necessary that any particular emotion arise
for the degradation ceremony to be successful. It is sufﬁcient
that members of the community understand that disapproval is
being conveyed to the offender.24 Kahan and Posner (1999,
p. 370) argue further that loss of reputation is the targeted
disvalue, that is, the punitive element aimed at by shaming,
mostly so when shaming is used against white-collar oﬀenders,
a class of oﬀenders particularly liable to stigma:
Shaming destroys ones reputation, but this injures the victim not because
reputation is intrinsically valuable but because now people will not trust
him, thus preventing him from obtaining future gains either through honest
cooperation with others or through exploitation of others under the guise of
honest cooperation. … Because shaming harms a persons reputation, and
reputation is a valuable asset, shaming presents itself as a possible punish-
ment that could be used by the government to deter crime.
24 Kahan (1996, pp. 636–637) oﬀers more direct evidence that the felt
emotion of shame is not what shaming penalties aim at. He does so while
defending his theory against the charge that shaming penalties cannot re-
spect a requirement of proportionality, as some individuals may be emo-
tionally much more sensitive than others to shaming. Kahan replies that this
approach to proportionality asks too much. One should not assess the
proportionality of shaming penalties by looking at their emotional eﬀect at
the individual level. After all, other criminal sanctions such as imprisonment
exact a diﬃcult-to-predict psychological and emotional toll that varies from
one oﬀender to the next. But these diﬀerential eﬀects are not ordinarily
thought to render imprisonment problematic on proportionality grounds.
We should rather understand proportionality in terms of the social meaning
of the sanction, by its ability to express, and the degree to which it expresses
moral condemnation. ‘‘Feeling shame is one thing. Being shamed is another.
Shames defenders insist proportionality analysis should focus on meaning
and not feelings’’ (Garvey 1998, p. 750).
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The authors understand loss of reputation as a valuable
asset though one that is relevant only for its instrumental
value: damage to it leads to losses in whatever things one may
gain from cooperating with others (e.g. economic exchange).
Shaming, then, functions as a punishment by inﬂicting the
deprivation of reputation and whatever material damage this
may cause.
We now have all the answers we need to position at least one
prominent account of ‘‘shaming penalties’’ on our map. Neither
shame nor any other emotion is the intended disvalue on this
account: the deprivation of reputation is. The Constitutive
View, in either its essential or inessential guise, is thus
excluded. This would seem to force Kahan and Posner in the
camp of the Non-Constitutive View. Yet, clearly, they would
not see themselves as belonging to that camp either. On their
account, neither shame nor any other emotion is explicitly
called on to justify shaming penalties. This leaves us with only
one logical option: ‘‘shaming penalties’’, at least as Kahan and
Posner conceive of them, are not a form of punishment con-
nected to the emotions of shame and guilt in any systematic
way. Hence, this view will not appear in our map.
This, I believe, is the view as their authors would conceive it.25
Whether it is a coherent or correct view, however, is what we
should consider next. In light of our analysis of punishment, we
should in particular be interested in the claim that it is not a
condition of a successful degradation ceremony that it induce any
particular emotion in the oﬀender. Two remarks are in order
here. First, the fact that a token penalty may qualify as success-
fully degrading in the absence of any speciﬁc emotion in the
targeted individual, does not show that at the type level there is no
connection between that type of degradation ceremony and some
speciﬁc emotion. If this is agreed, we can ask the second question:
is there really no connection between degradation ceremonies
and some speciﬁc negative emotion that qualify such ceremonies
as penalties? Kahans remark to the eﬀect that we may expect
25 It may be noteworthy to mention that Kahan (2006) has since recanted
his defence of shaming penalties. See Markel (2007) for a reply to Kahans
recantation.
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ceremonies to cause shame suggests that there is at least one
emotion and that the emotion in question is shame. To conﬁrm
this suggestion, in light of our previous analysis, we should ask
whether degradation ceremonies can successfully be understood
as forms of punishment in the absence of a widespread belief that
they are generally connected to shame.
Though I do not think the emotion in question is shame,
I would speculate that degradation ceremonies cannot be
understood as forms of punishment in the absence of one
emotion in particular, namely, humiliation. We can hardly begin
to think of ceremonial degradation as a penalty in the absence of
a widespread belief that it generally causes humiliation and, as
argued above, this may be true even when token ceremonies fail
to elicit humiliation. We can support this claim by jointly con-
sidering the central features of degradation ceremonies, on the
one hand, and the psychology of shame and humiliation, on the
other. As Kahan would agree, ceremonies involve the inten-
tional debasement of the oﬀender through reprimand before a
large audience. Similarly, as we saw in Section II, humiliation
but not shame is sensitive precisely to large audiences, to severe
reprimand, and to perception of intentional public debasement.
The structure of degrading ceremonies is an almost perfect ﬁt to
that of felt humiliation. To reinforce this claim, we may also
consider the alleged role of humiliation from the justiﬁcatory
point of view. On Kahans and Posners theory, deterrence
justiﬁes shaming penalties. Admitting that this is so, one may
ﬁnd it hard to believe that what will (directly on indirectly) deter
potential oﬀenders is the mere preoccupation with future losses
in cooperation unaccompanied by the extremely painful emo-
tional prospect of an orchestrated public humiliation.
To say this much, of course, is not to exclude that depriva-
tion of reputation and its consequences can also be the intended
disvalue of degradation ceremonies. It is rather to say that any
story that fails to mention humiliation lacks an essential
ingredient. Now, if humiliation is an essential ingredient of
shaming penalties as understood here, one of the main criti-
cisms against Kahans and Posners view, i.e., its illiberal nature
(Massaro 1997; Nussbaum 2004), acquires its full force. When
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experiencing humiliation a subject will experience his or her self
as degraded or debased. By including intentional felt humilia-
tion as part of the punishment and making a public spectacle of
it, the state could be perceived as expressing the view that the
oﬀender deserves to experience himself as a lesser being because
he is a lesser being. In many of its guises, however, liberalism
purports to be anchored in the ideal of equality or equal value.
The message the state would communicate by punishing in this
way would risk ﬂouting this ideal. This objection combined
with the negative empirical associations of humiliation (out-
ward directed anger and vengeful attitude) discussed in Sec-
tion II must give any liberal reason to hesitate before defending
shaming penalties.
The position espoused by Kahan and Posner is not the only
possible position available to defenders of shaming penalties.
Considering the problem of bad Samaritans, for example,
Etzioni proposed that their names
… be posted on a Web site and in advertisements (paid for by the offenders)
in key newspapers. Such postings would remove any remaining ambiguities
about what society expects from people who can help others when there is
no serious risk to their well-being. And those with a weak conscience or a
faltering civic sense would be nudged to do the right thing fearing that their
names would be added to the list of bad Samaritans, that their friends and
families would chide them, that their neighbors would snicker. (Etzioni
1999, p. 44)
Our initial question is once again: is shame, guilt or any
other emotion in particular the intended disvalue? In the pas-
sage above, Etzioni refers to shaming rather than shame and
mentions how shaming is supposed to work prospectively, that
is, by instilling fear of unwanted consequences in the potential
oﬀender. Etzioni does not single out any particular emotion as
that which we would not like to have inﬂicted. Perhaps fear of
hostile social reactions is a sign of prospective shame. Yet, if
one is a bad Samaritan to start with, shaming will be unlikely to
instil shame as much as mere fear of hostile reactions. Those for
whom shame is more likely to arise in this way have already
somehow internalised the attitudes or share the standards and
values of the shamers (see Williams 1994, pp. 78–84). A little
later Etzioni writes that:
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True or pure shaming involves only symbolic acts that communicate cen-
sure, ranging from relatively gentle expressions such as according a student
a C+ or sending a disruptive kid to stand in a corner, to more severe
measures such as facing the victim of ones assault in close quarters and then
apologizing to them in front of the community. Shaming diﬀers sharply
from many other forms of punishment—public ﬂogging, for instance—in
that the latter inﬂicts bodily harm rather than being limited to psychic
discomfort. (Etzioni 1999, p. 45)
Here it seems that shaming aims at inﬂicting ‘‘psychic dis-
comfort’’. We may take this to be the beginning of a Consti-
tutive View: some psychic discomfort is the intended disvalue
and hence part of the punishment.26 Nevertheless, we should
ask whether the psychic pain sought after is of a speciﬁc brand,
the pain of shame or the pain of guilt, or whether any emotion
involving psychic pain will suﬃce. The following is as close as
we get to an answer:
Most people are very reluctant—ashamed—to drive around with a glow-in-
the-dark DUI sticker on their car or to take out an ad apologizing for their
offences. An accountant who had been sentenced to stand in his neigh-
bourhood with a sign that said ‘‘I embezzled funds’’ seemed deeply dis-
traught when interviewed, musing that he might have been better off if he
had instead accepted a jail sentence. A woman convicted of welfare fraud in
Eau Claire, preferred to be jailed than to wear a sign admitting ‘‘I stole food
from poor people’’. This sort of intense response hardly reﬂects indifference.
(Etzioni 1999, pp. 47–48)
Indeed, it does not. The question, however, is whether non-
indifference implies shame or whether being ‘‘deeply dis-
traught’’ is really all that counts. Though Etzioni mentions
being ashamed as that which most people would feel, nothing
suggests that the punishment sought after here should consist in
the emotion of shame with its speciﬁc cognitions and associations.
26 Strictly speaking, nothing in the quote commented here directly com-
mits Etzioni to the Constitutive View. On the basis of what I reported in the
text, he could still claim that none of the emotions he refers to are the
intended disvalue of shaming. Yet, the fact that he compares the psychic
pain of shaming to the physical pain of ﬂogging, combined with the fact that
we would normally conceive of the physical pain as the intended disvalue of
ﬂogging, leads us to favour the Constitutive View interpretation.
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Shame, in other words, would be appropriate insofar as it is a
hedonically negative emotion. But so many other emotions
could ﬁt this bill. In particular given Etzionis emphasis on
shaming and the publicity this involves, we may expect, in line
with the empirical research mentioned above, that humiliation
would arise. Finally, in light of Etzionis emphasis on the pro-
spective use of these emotions (the fear of what would happen if
one acted as a bad Samaritan), it seems that the role of shame in
this sort of punishment is at most an inessential one.27
To say this much, however, is to admit that neither the pains
of shame nor those of guilt are essential to ‘‘shaming penalties’’.
This conclusion is reinforced when we recollect the position
that Kahan and Posner defend and even the one that I argued
they should want to defend, which essentially involved humil-
iation rather than shame or guilt. To those who had implicitly
assumed that shame or guilt were strictly connected to the
‘‘shaming penalties’’ this will be a surprise. Others, however,
will not be surprised by this conclusion. Criminal law theorists,
they would argue, are much more interested in the actual
punishing rather than what the punishment is intended to elicit
because they are concerned more for the role of the state in
punishing citizens and the values expressed and communicated
therein, and less with the subjective experience of punishment a
given defendant may feel. In other words, even though pun-
ishment includes both the punishing and its intended result, the
focus has to be on the former as it is through its activity that the
state expresses and communicates its values. Shaming and its
meaning is what is important here, not shame or whatever other
negative feeling it may elicit.
As argued in Section III, however, punishing involves a
conceptual connection with the disvalues it aims to inﬂict. We
simply cannot focus on any act of punishing without at the
same time bringing in the disvalues that qualify it as such. This
comes out most clearly precisely when we consider the
expressive and communicative meaning of a punishing act. In
27 The other known defender of shaming penalties, Book (1996) also
defends a position which sees shame as at best an inessential part of the
punishment.
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general any judgment of the form ‘‘F-ing is an un/acceptable
form of punishment because it expresses and communicates
value x rather than value y’’ must involve some assessment of
the type of disvalue generally associated with F-ing. If, for
example, we judge that F-ing is unacceptable, our judgement
must involve a negative assessment of the contribution towards
particular expressive and communicative aims that inﬂicting
such a disvalue makes. Now, as argued above, the disvalue may
be a feeling or emotion. Meaning, then, is connected to feeling
or emotion. To illustrate: suppose that one of the requirements
of any form of punishment is that it does not express or com-
municate the lesser dignity of the oﬀender. Suppose also that
certain degradation ceremonies are believed generally to elicit
the painful feeling that one is a lesser human being. What if not
precisely this fact would be necessary for the general perception
that by inﬂicting such penalties the state communicates the
lesser dignity of the oﬀender?
V. GUILT AND PUNISHMENT
Those authors more explicitly interested in the connection
between ‘‘shaming penalties’’ and the emotions typically con-
clude that not all sanctions listed in the Introduction deserve
that label as some of them typically elicit or are intended to
elicit guilt (Garvey 1998; Markel 2001), which, they rightly
maintain, is a rather distinct emotion from shame. This remark
betrays the idea that shaming is particularly linked to the
emotions of shame, something which, as argued above, is not
substantiated neither by what emotions are in fact most likely
to be elicited (most probably humiliation) nor by the alleged
intentions of those defending these penalties.28 Garvey (1998,
p. 767) and Markel (2001, p. 2229) defend penalties intended to
elicit guilt rather than shame as constituting the right kind of
punishment on their preferred justiﬁcatory theory of punishment.
28 Markel (2001, p. 2162, note 22), however, does admit to be conﬂating
the acts of shaming and humiliating someone.
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The following are some examples of the kind of penalties they
have in mind (Garvey 1998, pp. 775–794; Markel 2001, p.
2229):29
 Men in San Francisco, California, are required to attend the
‘‘School for Johns,’’ where former prostitutes lecture them about
life on the streets.
 A New York City landlord is sentenced to house arrest in one of
his own slums.
 A juvenile convicted of throwing a brick, which blinded the victim
in one eye, is ordered to wear an eye patch. He is permitted to
take it oﬀ only when he sleeps.
 A man who rammed his car into another car being driven by an
interracial couple is required to watch ‘‘Mississippi Burning.’’
 A rapist or pederast is punished not only with a period of
incarceration, but also with exposure to documentaries depicting
29 They distinguish guilt from shame on the basis of three criteria (Garvey
1998, p. 766; Markel 2001, pp. 2178–2179): (1) the private/public criterion,
and in particular the idea of an audience; (2) the self/behavior criterion; and
(3) the action tendencies respectively associated with shame and with guilt,
e.g., hiding and striking back for the former as opposed to focussing on the
wrong, making amends and righting the wrong for the latter. We saw that
neither shame nor guilt are essentially private emotions: they are both social
in important senses. Shame, however, is sensitive to variations in public
exposure in a way in which guilt is not. In that respect, if the aim is to elicit
shame and not guilt, it would be best to avoid any unnecessary public
exposure. With that aim in mind, it may also be correct to focus the
oﬀenders attention on his deed rather than on his self. Yet, there is reason
to believe that shame and guilt are not event-neutral (Olthof et al. 2004) and
that even the penalties preferred by Garvey and Markel may elicit shame
along with guilt. Being lectured by former prostitutes about life on the
streets may plausibly have as a result that the oﬀender focuses on the act as
well as those aspects of his self that led to the wrongful deed. Wearing an eye
patch all the time and hence, one should think, also in public places, may
seem to involve a certain measure of public exposure even though there is no
direct attempt to debase the oﬀender. What is more there is much evidence
to the eﬀect that shame and guilt are highly correlated both at the dispo-
sitional as well as the situational level (Tangney and Dearing 2002; Fisher
and Exline 2006; Harris 2003): guilt-prone subjects are also shame-prone
and vice versa, and occurrences of guilt are likely to be accompanied by
occurrences of shame and vice versa.
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how victims of rape or child molestation have been traumatised
by such actions.
On Garveys understanding, (1998, p. 765) at least some
punishments are justiﬁed insofar they aim at moral reform:
ideally, ‘‘the oﬀender comes through punishment to recognize
and understand the nature of his oﬀense, to experience guilt for
what he has done, and ﬁnally, to repent his wrongdoing and to
seek to make amends.’’ On Markels Confrontational Concep-
tion of Retribution (2001, p. 2229) guilting punishments ‘‘are
structured to induce a kind of contrition’’, i.e., repentance, deep
sorrow, remorse over a past wrongdoing, or a sense of guilt and
the desire for atonement. Clearly, these authors agree that guilt
and its cognate emotions should play a justiﬁcatory role in a
theory of punishment. However, proponents of both the Con-
stitutive and Non-Constitutive views could agree with that.
What we should ask, then, is whether on Garveys and Markels
accounts the pains of guilt are understood to be the intended
inﬂected disvalue or not.
For Garvey (1998) and Markel (2001), the idea is that guil-
ting punishments ‘‘set in motion the moral sequence of per-
ception of wrongdoing, guilt, and repentance.’’ (Garvey 1998,
p. 784) or that they are ‘‘contrition inducing’’ (Markel 2001,
p. 2231). Both authors produce detailed descriptions (Garvey
1998, pp. 775–794; Markel 2001, pp. 2229–2232) of how various
speciﬁc punishments (largely though abstractly inspired by Lex
Talionis) can induce guilt or start the ‘‘moral sequence’’. As
both authors agree, (Garvey 1998, p. 739; Markel 2001,
p. 2230) the idea is that punishment reﬂects back on the
oﬀender what he has done to his victim. Hence, the juvenile
who blinded his victim in one eye is ordered to wear an
eye patch at all times except when he goes to bed. Similarly, those
convicted of soliciting prostitutes receive a lecture by a former
prostitute about the horrors of life in the streets. Or again, the
case of the slumlord who is made to live in his own slum.
From the relevant passages, I evince that Garvey and Markel
would want to endorse the Non-Constitutive View. That is
because they systematically separate (1) the actual punishment
(2) as being justiﬁed by what it hopefully sets in motion, i.e.,
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guilt and penance. In fact, in the relevant passages, one ﬁnds no
mention of guilt as itself a disvalue or part of the punishment.30
Finally, both authors believe that there are always retributive
grounds to inﬂict hard treatment on the oﬀender whether or not
moral education/guilt is what justiﬁes such inﬂiction and even
when the oﬀender is already repentant.31 These authors, then,
are not essentially interested in the pains of guilt and yet the
guilting penalties they propose nonetheless aim at eliciting
guilt for its justiﬁcatory power: the fact that some hard treat-
ments involve a moral education/contrition-developing com-
ponent may communicate the states commitment to re-
integrating the oﬀender in the moral community.
On this version of the Non-Constitutive View, guilting
penalties aim to inﬂict guilt but not as a disvalue. If guilting
penalties are penalties, however, they must also involve the
intention to inﬂict a disvalue. At this point, then, we should ask
what that is. In light of the concrete examples of guilting pen-
alties listed above, we could postulate that the intended dis-
value is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. It can be the
disvalue that one incurs as one his lectured by a former pros-
titute or that of having to wear en eye-patch all day long.
Surely, such experiences may be annoying or fastidious. To that
extent, we may consider them disvalues independently of the
pains of guilt. What is less clear is whether we are inclined to
think such action types as embodying punitive hostility. If we
do not think of them as on a par with loss of liberty, loss of
property, ostracism and humiliation, we should cease to label
30 Markel (in correspondence, 5 September 2008) conﬁrmed that he was
not trying to state that guilt is a form of punishment.
31 See Garvey (1998, p. 770). Markel (2001) stresses that the ex ante
function of retribution is to maintain a social commitment to an order of
equal liberty over time. In the case of the quickly repentant oﬀender, we
coerce him to do or experience something he is averse to doing or experi-
encing (ﬁnes, incarceration) not because we want only guilt feelings to arise
but because this coercion is part of how we communicate our censure and
our commitment to equal liberty, by diminishing the plausibility of superi-
ority that attaches to someone claiming license and then stating, whether
sincerely or not, ‘‘I am sorry’’.
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them ‘‘punishments’’ or ‘‘penalties’’.32 This, of course, is still
compatible with admitting that they indeed constitute the most
appropriate response to certain types of oﬀences.
Garvey and Markel do not offer the only type of account
connecting guilt and punishment. Guilt is also central to
another recent and inﬂuential justiﬁcatory account of punish-
ment outside the context of guilting penalties. According to
Duff (2001), punishment is justiﬁed insofar as it communicates
appropriate censure for a past crime. The aim of such com-
munication is to dissuade citizens from committing crime and
to bring those who have committed a crime to focus on, rec-
ognise, and secularly repent their wrongdoing. Repentance
involves feelings of guilt though, contrary to these, it is a pro-
cess that must necessarily go deep with the repentant individ-
ual, for it occupies his attention, his thoughts, and his
emotions, for some considerable time. (Duﬀ 2001, p. 108)
Repentance is said to be an aim internal to punishment as
communication and to involve two other aims, namely self-
reform, and reconciliation. These three aims are hoped to be
achieved and even if they are not, punishment may still be
justiﬁed insofar as the criminal deserves it and insofar as one is
still trying to achieve such aims. These are forward-looking
aims but not ones assessed in consequentialist terms because
what counts toward the justiﬁcation of punishment is not how
far these aims are realised but that there is an attempt towards
their realisation. After all, communication takes two sides and
cannot be successful if the interlocutor refuses to hear.
32 Alternatively, one should argue that such alternative forms of punish-
ment do not involve the same concept of legal punishment as more ‘‘tradi-
tional’’ ones. Of course, we can imagine guilting penalties that actually involve
action types from this more ‘‘traditional’’ class. Forcing a landlord to live in
his own slum as a form of house arrest, for example, may involve a certain loss
of liberty. To the extent towhichwe are inclined to see house arrest as a formof
punishment, we will be inclined to see this guilting penalty as a form of pun-
ishment. These cases, however, add grist to my mill. They show that guilting
penalties count as punishment only insofar as they are act types that embody
punitive hostility.What ismore, asmentioned in Section III, there is reason to
suspect that the closer to ‘‘traditional’’ punishments guilting penalties are, the
harder it will be to show their connection to guilt, and hence the harder for
them to justify the ‘‘guilting’’ part of their label.
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Punishment as a communicative practice, however, is also
backward looking for it is justiﬁed only as an appropriate re-
sponse to criminal wrongdoing.
Would Duff espouse a Constitutive View of guilt and pun-
ishment? In places, Duff (2001, pp. 118–119, 197) does hint to
the existence of a hard treatment independent of the pains of
guilt and penance and geared to the eliciting of the latter. These
passages do suggest that Duﬀs would be ready to join the ranks
of the Non-Constitutive View, along with Garvey and Markel.
Yet, he also writes that: ‘‘In aiming to induce repentance,
punishment thus aims to bring oﬀenders to suﬀer what they
deserve to suﬀer—the pains of repentance and remorse.’’ The
pains associated with guilt constitute the hard treatment in-
ﬂicted upon the oﬀender and hence the punishment as well as
the avowed justiﬁcation. Here we seem to have a clear-cut
version of a Constitutive View of guilt as punishment, in its
essential version. If that is so, however, Duﬀ should deny that
punishment is justiﬁed for those oﬀenders who are already
sincerely repentant for their crime and hence already suﬀering
the pains of remorse and penance that they deserve to suﬀer.
Yet Duﬀ (2001, p. 119) refuses to do so, his argument being
that punishment also serves the aim of reconciliation which is
achieved through ‘‘the penal hard treatment that constitutes a
forceful and public apology.’’33 From this, we should evince
that Duﬀ thinks (a) that even if the pains of guilt constitute
punishment, they do not suﬃciently do so; and (b) there is some
disvalue that it is necessary to inﬂict and that is not the pains of
guilt.
Duff may insist that on his account the pains of guilt are
essential to the punishment. In a passage in which he argues
33 This thought is conﬁrmed once again when Duﬀ (2001, p. 108)
explicitly asks why a state should punish, e.g., inﬂict hard treatment, in
order to bring about penitence. Isnt a conviction issued by a court enough
for the purpose of focussing the oﬀender on the wrong he committed? Once
again, Duﬀ thinks that it is not but what is relevant for us is the idea that a
conviction may indeed be enough to generate full-blown repentance (and
not only ﬂeeting feelings of guilt) at least in some cases and in those cases, if
the pains of penance constituted the punishment, we would not need to
punish the oﬀender further.
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that even imprisonment may at times be a necessary form of
punishment (2001, pp. 148–152), he argues that it should serve
as a penance and in fact must be seen ‘‘as a species of penance’’.
Seeing it this way is possible
if its meaning is that the offender has, by his crime, made the maintenance of
normal community with him impossible but that community can be restored
if he undergoes this penance. His imprisonment then gives material form to
this implication of his crime—it seeks to bring him to recognize that his
crime has rendered the maintenance of normal community impossible. But it
also constitutes the penitential burden through which he can, if he does
repent, express his repentant and apologetic understanding of crime, or by
which, even if he does not repent, he is restored to normal community as if
he had repented.
Why would incarceration restore the offender to the
community even in the absence of repentance? The answer,
I imagine, must be that it does because there is a widespread
belief in the community that incarceration is generally con-
nected to disvalues that in fact embody punitive hostility and
censure and that are independent of the pains of guilt and pe-
nance. If not, why impose it or, in fact, why impose any hard
treatment over and above the pains of guilt and remorse?
The ambiguity that imbues this particular part of Duffs
account is, I think, indicative of another concern that this
version of the Constitutive View shares with Garveys and
Markels Non-Constitutive View. The worry is that just as the
guilting penalties discussed above, the pains of guilt and
penance cannot appropriately constitute punishment because
they do not instantiate the right connection to our attitudes of
punitive hostility hence the tendency of Duff to fall back on
more widely recognized forms of hard treatment. This worry is
more serious when applied to Duffs account to the extent to
which this account strives to reframe all punishments as species
of guilt and penance. If, as Duff suggests, we really are to
conceive of incarceration and other forms of punishment as
aiming to inﬂict the pains of guilt and repentance, the scope of
criticism described in this paragraph will extend to Duffs the-
ory of punishment as a whole and not only, as in the case of
Garvey and Markel, to guilting ‘‘penalties’’.
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Duff may retort that guilt and penitence are proposed as
part of an ideal theory of punishment, and not a theory that
could be directly applicable to present societies (Duff 2001,
pp. xv–xvi and Chap. 5). In our non-ideal conditions, the
argument would go, the censure punishment expresses
embodies punitive hostility and hard treatment. That, however,
does not have to be so. In more ideal conditions, the link with
punitive hostility may be severed: punishment would simply
function to communicate censure to rational individuals. As
much as I sympathise with this idea, I think it faces a consid-
erable challenge: what would the expression of censure or social
condemnation amount to in the absence of a link to punitive
hostility? In its absence, there is simply no reason to think that
communicating censure has any intelligible link to hard treat-
ment or the intended inﬂiction of a disvalue. What is more, if
like the authors discussed in this section, we emphasize as part
of our ideal theory that censure is to be communicated to
rational individuals what, in the absence of punitive hostility,
would lend intelligibility to the claim that communication
of censure should be harsh? Rational nature here seems to call
for remonstrating, reasoning, persuading, and entreating the
oﬀender, not for resorting to coercion and force. But then
communication of censure would become detached from hard
treatment or disvalue, which is the essence of punishment. The
communication would not take place through punishment, for
the latter necessarily talks to the individuals sense of pain.
Depending on what one builds into rational, a repost would
go, possibly, more fully rational beings would not need hard
treatment penalties. Yet, for reasons of public communication,
there would still be a place for symbolic punishments, which are
painful only in virtue of their meaning. What is more, there is
no reason why one should deﬁne punishment in terms of hard
treatment or the intended inﬂiction of a disvalue – as I did in
Section III – if that excludes purely symbolic punishments.
Certainly, punishment is intended to pain or burden the person
punished: but there is – for communicative theorists – a crucial
diﬀerence between purely symbolic punishments that pain only
in virtue of their meaning and how the oﬀender understands it;
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and hard treatment punishments that are also burdensome
independently of whatever meaning they have.34
Accepting this point entails either abandoning the idea that
punishment essentially involves hard treatment or understand-
ing hard treatment in a way that includes purely symbolic
punishments that pain only in virtue of their meaning. I am
quite sure that in certain contexts purely symbolic behaviour can
constitute hard treatment. Think for example of a mothers
remark to her son that she was seriously disappointed by his
behaviour. For some children such a remark may be enough of a
punishment: they may be shuttered while censure for their
behaviour was effectively communicated.35 Yet, even if we think
the mothers remark as a punishment, I do not think we can
understand her behaviour in light of punitive hostility. The
question we should ask, then, is whether the concept of legal
punishment is also intelligible without any reference to punitive
hostility. It seems to me hardly possible for retributivists to do
so, even for those who defend communicative retributivism.
I suppose, however, that some may want to answer positively, at
least when the answer comes in the context of an ideal theory of
punishment. To them I can simply reiterate my initial point. The
pain elicited by purely symbolic punishment is still pain; rational
creatures should not be ‘‘reasoned’’ through their sense of pain.
VI. CONCLUSION
From a conceptual point of view, there are a number of ways in
which one can connect punishment, on the one hand, and the
emotions of shame and guilt, on the other. To get ones bear-
ings in this ﬁeld, one should begin with the following cardinal
question: are shame and/or guilt the intended disvalue of the
punishing act or are they not? If they are, we may further ask
whether the speciﬁc pains that characterize each of these
emotions is sought as an essential part of the punishment or
34 I thank Antony Duﬀ for pointing this objection out to me.
35 In fact, several empirical studies attest that it is precisely within so-
called communal relations such as the one standing between parents and
children, and romantic partners that guilt is most likely to arise (Baumeister
et al. 1994).
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not. If shame and/or guilt are not constitutive of punishment,
then, any connection between them and a certain act of pun-
ishment must be realized purely at the level of justiﬁcation.
These questions have revealed themselves to be very useful not
only in affording a systematic grasp of the various theories in
this ﬁeld, but also in delivering a key to their evaluation. At the
most general level, the conclusion to be drawn is that all of
these theories could beneﬁt from considering more explicitly
and in detail the relation they establish between punishment
and the intended disvalue.
At a more particular level, I found that though Kahan and
Posner did consider that relation, their substantive conclusion
was at best incomplete. There is a stronger relation between
meaning and feeling or emotion than these authors are pre-
pared to admit. Felt humiliation, I argued, is an essential in-
tended disvalue of degradation ceremonies. Any defender of
this type of penalties must be aware that inﬂicting humiliation
involves the state in the communication of a kind of message it
should not want to express, at least from a liberal point of view.
Those who make a connection between guilt and punishment
were found to occupy rather different locations on our map.
Defenders of guilting penalties seem to endorse a Non-Con-
stitutive View, while Duffs communicative account of pun-
ishment seems to be a version of the Constitutive View. Though
the details of our critical assessments of these two positions
differ, the criticism is at bottom the same: it is doubtful that the
‘‘punishments’’ these accounts defend do effectively amount to
punishments. If they do, it is to the extent that they take the
form of more ‘‘traditional’’ and less ‘‘alternative’’ punishments.
Finally, we should note that the analysis of punishment offered
here, with its emphasis on the role that the intended disvalues
have in partially determining the status and acceptability of acts
of punishment, is a tool in principle applicable to the evaluation
of any candidate form of punishment.
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